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This chapter aims to draw some practical lessons and raises some issues from the 2008 
financial crisis for regulation of financial sectors in developing countries.  At the time of 
writing, the crisis is far from over and the aftermath is still unclear.  The chapter is 
divided into five sections.  The first section gives an overview of considerations that are 
important in drawing lessons from the crisis, especially from the point of view of 
developing economies.  The second section addresses the major issues of scope for, and 
limits to, counter-cyclicality in regulation, in view of the widely perceived need for such 
an approach to avoid similar crisis in the future.  The third section addresses an issue, 
which has been in focus since late 2008—the idea of comprehensiveness in the regulatory 
scope of the financial sector.  The fourth section explores possible improvements in 
regulatory structures that are provoked by the recent crisis.  The concluding section lists 
several broader issues that need to be kept in view while considering improvements in 
regulation of financial sectors for the future.   
 The observations made in this chapter are essentially from a practitioner’s 
perspective.  Furthermore, several comments are based on the author’s experience as 
Governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which is the Central Bank in India.  
Consequently, such comments have an advantage of pragmatism but may not necessarily 




There are extensive analyses on the origins and the evolution of the current financial 
crisis that are valuable for drawing lessons.  At the same time, several aspects of the crisis 
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are yet to be fully comprehended.  Hence, all lessons from the current crisis should be 
recognized as very valuable, but subject to possible modifications as greater insights into 
the events are gained.  Moreover, while some generalizations about the crisis are 
possible, they have to be contextualized to the particular economy under consideration, as 
developing economies are very diverse and at various stages of development regarding 
their financial sectors and their integration into the global economy.  It is equally 
important to recognize that the financial sectors in various economies have been impacted 
with different degrees of intensity.  For example, the extent to which the crisis has 
gripped the United States is in contrast to its neighbor Canada, which has been 
considerably less impacted despite having a fairly developed financial system and an 
open economy; this seems to be linked to better regulation of the Canadian Financial 
System.  In other words, lessons need to be drawn not only from the experience of those 
countries that are seriously affected and hence under intense scrutiny as this chapter goes 
to press, but also from those advanced and developing economies, which are less 
intensely affected.  
 It is noteworthy that in terms of first-order effect, at the time of writing, the 
financial institutions in developing economies are less affected than in advanced 
economies.  This could partly be attributed to the fact that the financial sectors in the 
developing economies are dominated by banks that still conduct traditional banking 
business and do not host complex financial products that could be riskier.  The credit 
crunch and volatility in equity markets in the advanced economies have certainly 
impacted institutions in developing countries, but this is essentially in the nature of 
contagion, especially if such markets or institutions happen to be over-leveraged.  The 
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contagion is, in any case, being transmitted though liquidity and credit crunch.  To the 
extent that money and credit markets in the developed world cause a squeeze on the 
credit available for cross border trade, there is a similar squeeze on the availability of 
trade credit to exporters and importers in the developing countries.  In addition, this poses 
greater pressure on the domestic money and spot foreign exchange (forex) markets as 
importers seek to borrow domestic currencies to purchase foreign exchange to honor their 
obligations. The banks in developing countries may be sound and well-functioning, but 
financing import-export trade with advanced economies requires similar well-functioning 
banks at their end too.  For example, opening and honoring a letter of credit requires 
cooperation among the two relevant banks.   In some developing economies, the 
weakening of local investor confidence in bonds and equities may be severe.  However, 
in economies where there is a high presence of foreign banks, the contagion through the 
financial sector can be more intense.   
The second-order effect, which has been very evident since late 2008 and is 
currently high on the agenda of developing economies, was caused by the volatility in 
capital flows that seriously impacts exchange rates.  The third-order effect, which is 
already influencing the level of confidence in developed and developing economies, is 
via linkages with the real sector, especially linkages in trade.  At the same time, there is 
extraordinary volatility in several commodity prices with severe impacts on many 
developing economies.  In this regard it might be better to distinguish between oil and 
non-oil commodities.  Moreover, the impact would vary depending on whether a country 
is a commodity exporter or importer.  No doubt, the impact would also differ depending 
on the movements in the exchange rates of the countries.  These have the potential to 
 4
generate non-performing assets on the balance sheets of banks in developing economies.  
Furthermore, non-performing loans could also arise from the wealth effect- channel of 
market risk being translated into credit risk.  It is also likely that remittances from non-
resident workers to developing economies may diminish in due course, and hence, 
economies heavily dependent on such remittances may experience pressures on exchange 
rates, especially if this is accompanied by outflows of capital.  Similarly, there could be 
lowering of aid and donor flows to low-income countries.  All of these developments 
have consequences for the real sector.  In brief, the causes and the cross-border 
transmission of the crisis may significantly differ between developed and developing 
economies, as well as among developing economies.  Appreciation of these differences is 
critical for drawing appropriate lessons from the crisis by developed and developing 
economies. 
 The impact on developing countries of the volatility in capital flows may be 
particularly severe by the mere fact that their economies are still nascent.  However, the 
soundness of the regulatory structures, policies or economic fundamentals should also be 
factored in.  There may be several reasons for this.  For example, developing economies 
have limited access to international currency reserves (see chapter by Ocampo in this 
book).  Furthermore, the scope for coordinated intervention akin to that by the Group of 
Seven (G7) economies, is limited for developing economies.  Moreover, international 
financial markets view the risk-reward frontier in developing economies differently than 
those in developed economies.   
 In terms of policy responses to the current crises, there are several features 
common to all economies: a focus on fiscal stimulus to growth, injection of liquidity and 
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reduction in policy interest rates.  But there are differences among them too.  The most 
visible is the magnitude of the injection of capital into banks and other financial 
intermediaries.  The most affected advanced economies took recourse to coordinate 
action by major central banks and their governments while the seriously affected 
developing economies approached multilateral agencies, in particular the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), for support.  It is noteworthy that some other developing countries 
have command over significant amounts of foreign exchange reserves. 
  In order to draw the appropriate lessons from this crisis for future regulations of 
financial sectors, it is essential to look beyond the financial sector, not only because the 
crisis is now no longer solely a financial problem—it is in fact now an economic crisis—
but also because the crisis itself reflects the prevalence of several macroeconomic 
imbalances and political economy considerations.  However, despite these complexities, 
for the purpose of this chapter it is necessary to focus on factors directly relevant to the 
financial sectors while drawing lessons from the crisis. 
 The prevailing standards of capital regulation for financial intermediaries, with 
some degree of acceptance at the global level, are the Basel II standards.  It has been 
argued that the crisis is in some ways a reflection of the inadequacy of the Basel II 
framework, though it has been developed by the regulators of developed economies 
working over several years.  It is also worth noting that the origin and the initial intensity 
of the crisis in the financial sector have been substantially concentrated in the two leading 
international financial centers.  Hence, the current problems may not be significantly 
reflective of financial regulation in many other economies.  In other words, it can be held 
that an incentive for softer regulation may exist when there is competition among a few 
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countries to attract the financial services industry.  The regulators’ willingness to tolerate 
savings in risk-capital employed by the regulated entities, and excessive reliance on self-
regulation  may be considered mechanisms adopted by some regulators for attracting the 
activity to the jurisdiction concerned.  In this process, the regulators may have 
underestimated the risks to the system and the costs of a bailout.  In theory, over a long 
period, markets should be able to perceive the risks emanating from self-regulation in a 
particular country, though in practice, the incentives and the relevant time horizons may 
lead to underestimation of such risks by market participants for a prolonged period.  The 
reliance on self-regulation by market participants—the principle-based approach to 
regulation involving limited use of prescription or rules, and the tolerance of shadow 
banking systems, as well as rapid innovations—may also be reflective of the attitudes of 
regulators, the incentive for the regulated, and the stakes for public policy.  The 
associated entities, such as Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs), may also have vested 
interests in a framework that is conducive to their expansion as well as continued 
dominance. 
 In this regard, it is essential to recognize that the eagerness to have a thriving 
international financial center is often, explicitly or implicitly, a decision of broader public 
policy.  In the normal course, the regulatory framework may have to align itself to such a 
stance of public policy, thus attracting several political economy considerations.  In India, 
a committee was appointed by the government to recommend measures to develop 
Mumbai (Bombay) as a regional financial center.  The recommendations were far 
reaching and involved the whole gamut of fiscal, monetary and prudential measures for 
the country as a whole.  There is an implicit assumption that the financial center in India 
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will not only provide employment and generate output, but also lead real sector 
development throughout the entire country.  No doubt, development of the financial 
sector plays a critical role, but not necessarily a leading role, in facilitating growth with 
stability; hence, there is a need to persevere with reforms in the financial sector along 
sound lines, including sufficient and effective regulation that serves the main goals of the 
real economy.  In this regard, the 2008 financial crisis has generated debates on several 
fronts, but with regards to this chapter, the three important areas specific to regulation of 
the financial sector include the following: the relevance of counter-cyclical regulation, 





Several arguments have been advanced in favor of injecting elements of counter-
cyclicality into regulation.  In particular, senior officials at the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) have in recent years been advocating for greater attention to the rapid 
growth of credit, deterioration in the quality of credit and steep acceleration in the prices 
of assets.  The RBI and a few others, such as the Central Bank of Spain, have taken 
recourse to various instruments of counter-cyclical prudential regulation.  RBI had 
adopted neutral or tight monetary policy in an uninterrupted fashion, from 2004 up until 
the third quarter of 2008, using both direct and indirect instruments of monetary policy.  
Similarly, the RBI had been using prudential measures relating to foreign currency 
exposures of all financial intermediaries under its jurisdiction as part of the management 
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of the capital account. Furthermore, a range of monetary, prudential and fiscal 
instruments have been used to influence the overall liquidity in the markets.  On the basis 
of this limited experience (described more below), it can be held, that operationally it 
may be feasible to design instruments for counter-cyclical regulations, and use them 
effectively, consistent with objectives regarding growth in output, inflation and overall 
stability of the financial sector.  
 The case for counter-cyclical policies in regard to developing economies is 
stronger than others, owing to the fact that higher weight has to be accorded to stability in 
these economies.  Growth is essential for the eradication of poverty in such economies, 
but the gains from growth typically occur to the poor with a time lag.  However, the pains 
of high inflation, as well as financial instability, affect the poor instantly.  Furthermore, 
there is empirical evidence that costs in terms of increases in poverty are higher if output 
falls, than the reduction of poverty for an equivalent rise in output.  Moreover, the poor 
have marginal capabilities and resources to manage or mitigate risks, while most 
governments in developing economies have very few mechanisms for social safety nets.  
At the same time, designing and implementing a counter-cyclical policy is more complex 
in developing economies.  The cycles are not easily identifiable, especially if a significant 
structural transformation is underway in the economy.  In some countries with persistent 
fiscal deficits, like India, the wriggle room for expansionary fiscal policy may be limited.  
The transmission of monetary policy is constrained by several factors, in particular the 
development of financial markets.  The environment of public policies, especially 
through administered interest rates and directed credit, makes the transmission more 
complex.  The effectiveness of prudential measures depends on the standards of 
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governance in financial institutions operating in that country.  Above all, a relatively 
open capital account makes transmission of monetary policy muted.  There is, therefore, 
in developing countries, a special case for harmonized counter-cyclical policies in the 
three spheres of policies: monetary, prudential regulation and fiscal.   
 It is well recognized that identifying the construction of asset bubbles is difficult.  
But the issue of operational purposes is where the judgment should tilt when there are 
doubts.  Perhaps in all developing economies, the tilt may have to be to protect, at a 
minimum what may be considered critical financial institutions, namely banks, from the 
serious ill effects of the bubble, if it were to build up and burst.  Banks stand out as most 
critical, since a common person, particularly in developing economies, seeks an 
institution,, traditionally banks,, where his personal savings are safe.  It is essential for 
public policy to assure such a facility, and recent events have shown that the governments 
would be obliged to make such a facility available even ex-post crisis.  In brief, there is a 
strong case, based on the experience of the 2008 events, to ensure that bank depositors 
are protected from the ill effects of volatile business cycles.  In response to rapid growth 
of credit and asset prices, RBI took temporary measures that included generally 
increasing the risk weights, seeking additional provisioning, imposing quantitative limits 
and engaging in supervisory review of select banks to protect them to the extent possible, 
from the possibility of a serious downturn in asset prices.  The quantitative limits on 
exposures and a few other prescriptions were flexible with regard to any specific 
institution, provided its risk containment policies were to the satisfaction of the regulator. 
 
Comprehensiveness in regulatory scope 
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 There is a plea for greater comprehensiveness in the institutions that are subject to 
regulation.  First, while the regulators focused their attention on the commercial banks, 
the crisis essentially originated from non-banks, especially investment banks, and in 
some ways the non-regulated parts of commercial banks, as well as hedge funds or 
private-equity funds.  Second, the relationships between banks and non-banks were not 
adequately regulated, with the result that the assurance of liquidity support from banks 
implicit in such relationships was not properly monitored.  The consequences of the 
originate and distribute model partly reflected this weakness.  Third, while regulating the 
commercial banks, their excessive dependence on resources other than deposits was not 
monitored.  Fourth, large corporate magnates have emerged as big players in financial 
markets, but financial regulators have failed to regulate them.  Some of the players 
operated in a way that their operations became too big to fail.  Fifth, the risk of individual 
financial institutions could have been assessed by each institution, to the satisfaction of 
the regulator.  But the exposures of institutions to each other within the financial sector 
might have been largely ignored.  It may be noted that this phenomenon is different from 
consolidated supervision of conglomerates, in the sense that it relates to exposures of 
conglomerates to each other collectively.  Sixth, financial innovations appeared to spread 
the risk widely, and often away from regulated entities like banks and institutional 
companies.  In reality however, such innovations removed the risks from regulators’ 
radar, while substantively reverting to the banking system under stressful conditions.  
Correspondingly, the off-balance sheet obligations of financial institutions might have 
been seriously underestimated by the regulators. 
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 There are several issues of costs and benefits associated with more comprehensive 
regulation, but the financial crisis of 2008 has de facto enlarged the scope of central 
banking in terms of institutions dealt with and instruments used by them, especially in 
regards to their function as lender of last resort.  In a way, therefore, comprehensiveness 
in financial regulation has perhaps come to stay.  But what is needed is a well thought out 
redrawing of the boundaries and intensity of financial regulation across financial 
institutions and their activities. 
 The RBI had attempted to address these issues in several ways even as the 
problems were building up in the global financial sector.  The RBI retained its 
jurisdiction to regulate approximately 30,000 non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), 
but operationally it focused only on the deposit taking institutions, and systemically 
important ones, defined on the basis of the size of the balance sheet.  The regular 
monitoring of systemically important NBFCs ensured that corrective measures were 
undertaken in a timely manner, particularly in terms of enhancing capital requirements in 
2006.  Furthermore, the extent of direct and indirect exposures of the banking system to 
such NBFCs was also regulated.  The NBFCs themselves were divided into several 
categories and regulatory regimes were fine-tuned to suit each category.  Noticing 
tendencies of banks to hold each others’ equities on their books, a limit of 5 percent of 
total equity was placed on any bank holding in any other single bank.  The guidelines on 
securitization issued in 2006 provide a conservative treatment of securitization, exposures 
for capital adequacy purposes, especially in regards to the credit enhancement and 
liquidity facilities.  In order to reduce the extent of concentration of banks’ liabilities, 
guidelines were issued. placing prudential limits on the extent of their inter-bank liability.  
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In addition, guidelines were issued in order to contain risks arising out of banks’ 
investment portfolio, in particular non-government securities.  Banks were specifically 
advised not to be solely guided by the ratings assigned to these securities by the credit 
rating agencies, which was in the nature of moral suasion only.  Articulation of issues 
relating to financial stability in the public domain, moral suasion, supervisory review of 
over extended individual banks, and emphasis on regulatory comfort rather than mere 
regulatory compliance were some important instruments used in regard to several areas of 
regulatory concern.  In brief, the experience of RBI indicates that it is possible to 
dynamically define boundaries of regulation depending on evolving conditions in the 
financial sectors provided that the regulators have the mandate, skills, and above all, real 
operational freedom.  A comprehensive coverage, as per mandate with operational 
freedom, executed in terms of exhaustive monitoring, but with selectivity in prescriptions 
and intervention, appears to add to the capacity of the regulators to dynamically redefine 




There is a view that the current crisis was essentially caused by regulators’ inability to 
cope with the pace of financial innovation and partly on account of weaknesses in 
regulatory structures at the national and international level.  In this regard, it is useful to 
note that the most seriously affected financial institutions are those which were reputed to 
have the best capabilities in risk-assessment and risk-management.  Similarly, the 
reportedly high regulatory standards of the most seriously affected countries were not 
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adequate to avert a crisis.  Consequently, it is held that the fault may be with the 
structures of regulation, and hence a case is made for improvements in regulatory 
structures.  At a very general level, it can be argued that there is no convincing evidence 
of serious shortcomings in the regulatory environment of developing economies as far as 
the current crisis is concerned.  Therefore, the focus should be on the issues of regulation 
in advanced economies and on global regulatory structures, in view of the globalization 
of finance that has also contributed to the crisis. 
 The current debates on appropriate national-level regulatory parameters are also 
of interest to the developing economies due to their goals of aligning with internationally 
set standards of globalization of finance.  First, it is suggested that a single regulator for 
the financial sector would avoid regulatory arbitrage and add to stability, while the 
central bank would be responsible for monetary policy and financial stability.  Another 
view is that, ideally, the central bank itself could assume the responsibility of a single 
regulator, combining the monetary and regulatory functions.  Yet another view, 
particularly relevant for developing economies, is that the regulation of banking should 
lie with the central bank, and the regulation of others could be separated.  The empirical 
evidence so far appears very mixed.  Hence, it may not be appropriate to take a definite 
view on the issue of single versus multiple regulators.  However, whatever the structure 
is, close coordination between regulatory functions is critical, irrespective of whether 
they are located in single or multiple authorities.  In India, the RBI, in addition to 
regulating banks, regulates NBFC’s, money, and government securities markets and 
payment systems.  Regulation of other activities in the financial sector is distributed 
among capital-market, insurance and pension funds regulators.  However, to ensure 
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coordination within the financial sector, a High Level Committee on Capital and 
Financial Markets (HLCCM) has been constituted.  This is presided over by the governor 
of the RBI, and includes the membership of the heads of the regulatory bodies in the 
financial sector and the Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Finance.  The HLCCM has in 
turn constituted standing technical committees to ensure coordination on operational 
issues and provide assistance to the committee.  In summary, the Indian experience points 
to the desirability of establishing standing mechanisms for close and continuous 
coordination of regulation in the financial sector, irrespective of the fact that statutory 
compulsions do not exist for new mechanisms. 
 There is also a view that regulation of the financial sector has often been left to 
experts in finance, money or economics, and that such an approach encourages an inward 
looking view of regulation, which potentially ignores the implications and externalities 
for other stakeholders, including depositors, borrowers or consumers of financial 
services.  On the other hand, it is also recognized that regulation of the financial sector is 
highly specialized and technical in nature.  In India, the Board for Financial Supervision 
(BFS) within the RBI has been established to make regulation and supervision somewhat 
autonomous within the RBI.  The Board advises and guides the RBI in all matters relating 
to the regulation and supervision of banks and NBFCs.  The Board, which meets at least 
once a month, is presided over by the Governor-RBI, and in addition to the Deputy, 
Governors have four non-official, part-time independent members.  These members are 
eminent individuals who are from such diverse fields as accounting, macro-economics, 
the corporate sector, and civil-society associated with non-governmental organizations.  It 
is interesting to note that the BFS identifies any bank whose operations give rise to 
 15
regulatory discomfort, and puts it under what is described as monthly monitoring of its 
functioning.  Yet another set of institutions are the Technical Advisory Committees, 
which address issues relating to regulation, and whose members comprise of academics, 
representatives from self-regulatory organizations, industry-associations and select 
representatives of the regulated entities.  These committees meet less frequently than the 
BFS, and unlike the BFS, have no statutory backing.  While the BFS has been very 
effective, the contributions of Technical Advisory Committees have been mixed, 
depending on the nature of the subject.  For example, the committees on monetary policy 
and financial markets were more active than the ones on financial regulation. 
 Finally, there is a view that it is desirable for central banks to have a formal 
mandate for ensuring financial stability.  In India, the RBI has no formal mandate for 
financial stability, but it has interpreted its mandate on monetary stability to include 
operational purposes—both price and financial stability in addition to growth.  The 
general approach has been to pursue multiple objectives with explicit statements of 
relative priorities, from time to time, depending on the circumstances evidenced by 
multiple indicators.  In fact, the regulation of banks is one of the multiple instruments 
used for operational purposes of RBI’s policy objectives. 
 
Some Broader Issues 
 
There are several broader issues which need to be kept in view while considering changes 
in the regulatory structures of regimes within developing economies, especially the 
Anglo-Saxon ones, in light of the recent financial crisis.  During the crisis, whatever has 
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to be done must be done promptly, comprehensively and effectively to bring stability; but 
in rewriting regulatory structures, some broader issues need to be considered.  Most 
developing economies recognize the continuing need for reforms in their financial sector.  
However, the crisis of 2008 raises doubts as to the efficacy of known and existing models 
of financial sectors in advanced economies.  Thus, in the future, reforms in the financial 
sector may have to be cognizant of the evolving understanding of the subject, and hence, 
gradualism commends itself.  Furthermore, the fundamental changes in regulatory 
regimes do require acceptance by political authorities and indeed legislative actions. 
 In this regard, it is necessary to avoid drawing misleading lessons from the crisis.  
Some observers think that the experience with subprime lending in the United States 
shows that providing finance to those who cannot afford it is not desirable.  Financial 
inclusion should mean ensuring access to all relevant financial services, to all sections of 
the populace, and it should not be equated with aggressive lending or simple provisions 
of microcredit with profit motives driving the process.  In fact, the 2008 crisis shows that 
banks with a significant retail base tended to be more resilient.  
 Recent debates on the 2008 crisis have focused on the role of tax havens, and in 
this regard, developing economies have a high stake in view of the large share of capital 
flows through such tax havens.  Some of them are brought about by bilateral agreements 
among countries, often as part of Free Trade Agreements.  In addition, enforcement of 
financial regulation is made particularly difficult by the inadequate attention to “Know 
Your Investor” in some jurisdictions, and tax regimes that encourage cross border round 
tripping of funds by residents.   
 17
The role of CRAs has also received considerable adverse attention.  The relevant 
issues for regulators in developing economies are: the appropriate regulatory frameworks 
governing them, use of credit ratings by the regulators, and more importantly, the 
desirability of encouraging domestic CRAs that could serve the growing needs of the 
developing economies.  Such domestic credit rating agencies could have the potential to 
compete with the existing international agencies. 
 One of the most important lessons from the crisis is the need to recognize linkages 
between the financial sector and the real sector.  In view of the recent experience with 
what may be termed as “excessive financialization of economies,” should there be a 
review of the sequencing and pacing of reforms in the financial sector relative to the 
fiscal and the real sectors in developing economies?  In light of the observed volatility in 
capital flows and also of commodity prices, how should the policies relating to the 
financial sector in the developing economies provide cushions against such shocks?  
Similarly, should there be a review of sequencing various elements in the development of 
domestic financial systems in the developing economies, and their integration into the 
global financial system?  Finally, is it inevitable that the relationships between 
government, central banks and financial regulators will be redrawn in view of the very 
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